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Abstract. Context: Agile development is in widespread use, even in
safety-critical domains. Motivation: However, there is a lack of an ap-
propriate safety analysis and verification method in agile development.
Objective: In this paper, we investigate the use of Behavior Driven De-
velopment (BDD) instead of standard User Acceptance Testing (UAT)
for safety verification with System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA)
for safety analysis in agile development. Method: We evaluate the effect
of this combination in a controlled experiment with 44 students in terms
of productivity, test thoroughness, fault detection effectiveness and com-
munication effectiveness. Results: The results show that BDD is more
effective for safety verification regarding the impact on communication
effectiveness than standard UAT, whereas productivity, test thorough-
ness and fault detection effectiveness show no statistically significant
difference in our controlled experiment. Conclusion: The combination of
BDD and STPA seems promising with an enhancement on communica-
tion, but its impact needs more research.
1 Introduction
Agile practices have been widely used in software industries to develop systems
on time and within budget with improved software quality and customer satis-
faction [1]. The success of agile development has led to a proposed expansion to
include safety-critical systems (SCS) [2]. However, to develop SCS in an agile
way, a significant challenge exists in the execution of safety analysis and veri-
fication [3]. The traditional safety analysis and verification techniques, such as
failure mode effect analysis (FMEA) and fault tree analysis (FTA) are difficult
to apply within agile development. They need a detailed and stable architecture
[4].
In 2016, we proposed to use System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) [6]
in agile development for SCS [5]. First, STPA can be started without a detailed
and stable architecture. It can guide the design. In agile development, a safety
analyst starts with performing STPA on a high-level architecture and derives
the relevant safety requirements for further design. Second, Leveson developed
STPA based on the systems theoretic accident modeling and processes (STAMP)
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causality model, which considers safety problems based on system theory rather
than reliability theory. In today’s complex cyber-physical systems, accidents are
rarely caused by single component or function failures but rather by compo-
nent interactions, cognitively complex human decision-making errors and social,
organizational, and management factors [6]. System theory can address this.
The safety requirements derived from STPA need verification. However, there
is no congruent safety verification in agile development. Most agile practitioners
mix unit test, integration test, field test and user acceptance testing (UAT) to
verify safety requirements [2]. In 2016, we proposed using model checking com-
bined with STPA in a Scrum development process [7]. However, using model
checking, a suitable model is necessary but usually not available in agile devel-
opment. In addition, the formal specification increases the difficulties of commu-
nication, which should not be neglected when developing SCS [8]. BDD, as an
agile technique, is an evolution of test driven development (TDD) and accep-
tance test driven development (ATDD). The developers repeat coding cycles in-
terleaved with testing. TDD starts with writing a unit test, while ATDD focuses
on capturing user stories by implementing automated tests. BDD relies on test-
ing system behavior in scenarios by implementing a template: Given[Context],
When[Event], Then[Outcome] [31]. The context describes pre-conditions or sys-
tem states, the event describes a trigger event, and the outcome is an expected
or unexpected system behavior. It could go further into low-level BDD1. Yet, it
has not been used to verify safety requirements. Leveson said [6]: “Accidents are
the result of a complex process that results in system behavior violating the safety
constraints.” Hence, in agile development, we need safety verification to: (1) be
able to guide design at an early stage, (2) strengthen communication and (3)
focus on verifying system behavior. Thus, we believe that BDD might be suitable
for safety verification with STPA for safety analysis in agile development.
Contributions
We propose a possible way to use BDD with STPA for safety verification in
agile development. We investigate its effects regarding productivity, test thor-
oughness, fault detection effectiveness and communication effectiveness by con-
ducting a controlled experiment with the limitation that we execute BDD only in
a test-last way. The results show that BDD is able to verify safety requirements
based on system theory, and is more effective than UAT regarding communica-
tion for safety verification.
2 Related Work
Modern agile development processes for developing safety-critical systems (SCS)
advocate a hybrid mode through alignment with standards like IEC 61508, ISO
26262 and DO-178. There have been many considerable successes [9] [10] [11].
However, a lack of integrated safety analysis and verification to face the changing
architecture through each short iteration is a challenge for using such standards.
1
Low-level BDD is possible to define low-level specifications and interwined with TDD [16].
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In 2016, we proposed to use STPA in a Scrum development process [5]. It showed
a good capability to ensure agility and safety in a student project [12]. However,
we verified the safety requirements only at the end of each sprint by executing
UAT together with TDD in development. A lack of integrated safety verifica-
tion causes some challenges, such as poor verification and communication. The
previous research regarding safety verification in agile development suggested
using formal methods [13] [14]. However, they need models and make intuitive
communication harder [7]. In addition, they have not considered specific safety
analysis techniques.
Hence, we propose using BDD to verify safety requirements. BDD is specif-
ically for concentrating on behavior testing [15]. It allows automated testing
against multiple artifacts throughout the iterative development process [17].
Moreover, it bridges the gap between natural language-based business rules and
code language [18]. Okubo et al. [19] mentioned the possibilities of using BDD
for security and privacy acceptance criteria. They define the acceptance criteria
by creating a threat and countermeasure graph to write attack scenarios. They
verify the satisfication of security requirements by testing the countermeasures,
to see whether they can make the attack scenarios or unsecure scenarios fail. Lai,
Leu, and Chu [20] combined BDD with iterative and incremental development
specifically for security requirements evaluation. They defined the behavioral
scenarios by using use case diagram and misuse case diagram. STPA encom-
passes determining safe or unsafe scenarios. We aim to use BDD verifying these
scenarios.
To investigate the effect of using BDD for safety verification, we design a
controlled experiment referring to a set of TDD experiments. Erdogmus, Mori-
sio and Torchiano [23] conducted an experiment with undergraduate students
regarding programmer productivity and external quality in an incremental devel-
opment process. For safety verification in agile development, a high productivity
of safety test cases promotes high safety. Madeyski [26] conducted an experiment
comparing “test-first” and “test-last” programming practices with regard to test
thoroughness and fault detection effectiveness of unit tests. BDD for safety veri-
fication covers also low-level tests. Thus, we decided to investigate productivity,
test thoroughness and fault detection capability in this experiment. [21] [22] [28]
[29] [30] provided evidence of using these three measures. In addition, George
and Williams [29] focused on the understandability of TDD from the devel-
oper’s viewpoint. Using BDD for safety verification, we notice the importance
of communication between developers and business analysts. We investigate un-
derstandability in the measure of communication effectiveness.
3 STPA Integrated BDD for Safety Analysis and
Verification (STPA-BDD)
In this article, we propose STPA-BDD. We mainly focus on safety verification.
As we can see in Fig. 1, we have two main parts: STPA safety analysis and BDD
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Fig. 1: STPA-BDD Concept
safety verification. A safety analyst2 (QA) starts performing STPA safety anal-
ysis with a sufficient amount of code3. STPA is executed by firstly identifying
potentially hazardous control actions, and secondly determining how unsafe con-
trol actions (UCAs) could occur. STPA derives the safety requirements, which
constraint the UCAs, as well as system behaviors. Additionally, it explores the
causal factors in scenarios for each UCA. The output from the safety analyst
(QA) is an STPA safety report with system description, control structure, acci-
dents, hazards, UCAs, corresponding safety requirements, process variables and
algorithms.
In BDD safety verification, to generate and test scenarios, the UCAs (in
STPA step 1), process variables and algorithms (in STPA step 2) from the STPA
safety report are needed. We write other data into “others”. BDD safety veri-
fication has two steps: In step 1, the business analyst, the safety analyst (QA)
and the developer establish a “3 Amigos Meeting” to generate test scenarios.
In a BDD test scenario4, we write the possible trigger event for the UCA in
When [Event]. The other process variables and algorithms are arranged in
Given [Context]. Then [Outcome] presents the expected behavior - a safe
control action. In Fig. 2 (a), we present an example. The safety analyst (QA) has
provided a UCA as During auto-parking, the autonomous vehicle does not stop
immediately when there is an obstacle upfront. One of the process variables with
relevant algorithms detects the forward distance by using an ultrasonic sensor.
The developer considers a possible trigger as the ultrasonic sensor provides the
wrong feedback. Thus, a BDD test scenario should test if the ultrasonic sensor
provides the feedback that the forward distance <= threshold (means there is an
2
Since we focus on safety in our research, we assign a safety analyst as the QA role in our context.
3
More descriptions of STPA for safety analysis are given in [7] concerning an example of using
STPA in an airbag system and [12] concerning the use of STPA in a Scrum development process.
4
We illustrate a BDD test scenario using only three basic steps “Given” “When” “Then”. More
annotations, such as “And”, can also be added.
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obstacle upfront) and whether the vehicle stops. They write this after When.
The context could be the autonomous vehicle is auto-parking. We write them
after Given. Then constraints the safe control action as the autonomous vehi-
cle stops immediately. More possible triggers are expected to be generated after
When to test them. In step 2, after the three amigos discuss and determine the
test scenarios, the developer starts generating them into test cases, as shown
in Fig. 2 (b). BDD test cases use annotations such as @Given, @When, and
@Then to connect the aforementioned test scenarios with real code. The devel-
oper produces code to fulfill each annotation. We can identify unsafe scenarios
when the test cases fail. We correct the trigger event to pass the test cases to
satisfy the safety requirement.
(a) Test scenario example (b) Test case example
Fig. 2: BDD safety verification example
4 Experiment Design5
4.1 Goal
Analyze BDD6 and UAT7 for safety verification.
For the purpose of comparing their effect.
With respect to productivity by measuring the number of implemented (tested)
user stories per minute; test thoroughness by measuring line coverage; fault de-
tection effectiveness by measuring a mutation score indicator; communication
effectiveness by conducting a post-questionnaire.
From the point of view of the developers and business analysts.
In the context of B.Sc students majoring in software engineering or other
related majors executing acceptance testing.
5
We follow the guideline by Wohlin et al. [32].
6
We have a limitation in our experiment that we execute BDD only in a test-last way. More
discussion of this issue can be found in Section 6.2
7
To execute a standard UAT, we mainly refer to [38] with fictional business analysts.
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4.2 Context
Participants: The experiment ran off-line in a laboratory setting in an “Intro-
duction to Software Engineering” course at the University of Stuttgart. Since
the course includes teaching BDD and UAT technology, the students are suit-
able subjects for our experiment. We arrange them based on Java programming
experiences (not randomly). According to a pre-questionnaire14, 88.6% of the
students are majoring in software engineering. We conclude from Table 1 that
they have attended relevant lectures and handled practical tasks relating to Java
programming, acceptance testing, SCS (with a median value >= 3 on a scale
from 1 to 5). The agile techniques show less competency (with a median value
of 2 on a scale from 1 to 5). We provide a 1-to-1 training, which lasts 44 hours
overall, to reduce the weaknesses.
Development environment : We use a simplified Java code with mutants from
a Lego Mindstorms based Autonomous Parking System (APS) and Crossroad
Stop and Go System (CSGS). These two systems are comparable by lines of code
and number of functional modules14. To ease writing test cases, we use a lejo
TDD wrapper, Testable Lejos8 to remove deep dependencies to the embedded
environment. The BDD groups (Group A1 and Group A2) operate in an Eclipse
IDE together with a JBehave plug-in (based on JUnit)9. We use Eclipse log files
and JUnit test reports for calculating the number of implemented (tested) user
stories. Finally, we use PIT Mutation Testing10 to assess line coverage and a
mutation score indicator. The UAT groups (Group B1 and Group B2) write the
test cases in Microsoft Word.
Table 1: Medians of the student’s background
Area Group A1 Group A2 Group B1 Group B2
Java programming 3 3 3 3
Acceptance testing 4 5 3 3
Safety-critical systems 3 4 4 4
Agile techniques 3 3 3 2
Note: The values range from “1” (little experience) to “5” (experienced). Group A1 and Group A2 use BDD, while
Group B1 and Group B2 use UAT.
4.3 Hypotheses
We formulate the null hypotheses as:
H0 PROD: There is no difference in productivity between BDD and UAT.
H0 THOR: There is no difference in test thoroughness between BDD and UAT.
H0 FAUL: There is no difference in fault detection effectiveness between BDD
and UAT.
H0 COME : There is no difference in communication effectiveness between BDD
and UAT.
The alternative hypotheses are:
H1 PROD: BDD is more productive than UAT when producing safety test cases.
H1 THOR: BDD yields better test thoroughness than UAT.
8
http://testablelejos.sourceforge.net/
9
http://jbehave.org/eclipse-integration.html
10
http://pitest.org/
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H1 FAUL: BDD is more effective regarding fault detection than UAT.
H1 COME : BDD is more effective regarding communication than UAT.
4.4 Variables
The independent variables are the acceptance testing techniques. The dependent
variables are: (1) productivity (PROD). It is defined as output per unit effort
[23]. In our experiment, the participants test the user stories in the STPA safety
report and produce safety test cases. We assess it via the number of implemented
(tested) user stories11 per minute (NIUS) [23]; (2) test thoroughness (THOR).
Code coverage is an important measure for the thoroughness of test suites in-
cluding safety test suites [27]. Considering a low complexity of our provided
systems, line coverage (LC) [26] is more suitable than branch coverage (BC);
(3) fault detection effectiveness (FAUL). Mutation testing [25] is powerful and
effective to indicate the capability at finding faults [26]. In our experiment, we
measure how well a safety test suite is able to find faults at the code level. We
assess this via a Mutation Score Indicator (MSI) [26]; (4) communication effec-
tiveness (COME). We assess this via a post-questionnaire with 11 questions for
developers covering topics like understandability and 13 questions for business
analysts covering topics like confidentiality according to Adzic [35]. The results
are in a 5-point scale from -2 (negative) to +2 (positive).
4.5 Pilot study
Six master students majoring in software engineering took part in a pilot study.
We arranged a four-hour training program. The first author observed the opera-
tion and concluded as follows: (1) The STPA safety report was too complicated
to be used by inexperienced students. We used a comprehensive STPA report by
using XSTAMPP12 in the pilot study. However, a lot of unnecessary data, such
as accidents, hazards and safety requirements at the system level, influenced the
understanding. It costs too much time to capture the information. Thus, we sim-
plified the STPA report with the process variables, algorithms, and UCAs. (2)
We used the original Java code from a previous student project. The complex
code affected the quick understanding. After the pilot study, we simplified it.
(3) Training is extremely important. In the pilot study, one participant had not
taken part in the training program, which led to his experiment being unfinished.
We provide a textual tutorial and system description for each participant as a
backup. (4) We have only used an experiment report to record the measures.
However, the pure numbers sometimes cannot show clear causalities. Thus, we
use a screen video recording in parallel with the experiment report.
4.6 Experiment operation
As we can see in Fig. 3, we divide the 44 participants into 4 groups. We provide
2 systems and evaluate 2 acceptance testing methods. Group A1 uses BDD for
11
In this article, user stories are safety-related user stories.
12
http://www.xstampp.de/
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Fig. 3: Experiment operation
system 1. Group A2 uses BDD for system 2. Group B1 uses UAT for system
1. Group B2 uses UAT for system 2. We use two systems to evaluate the com-
munication between developers and business analysts. The developers are the
participants in each group, while the fictional business analysts are portrayed by
the participants in the other group using various testing methods and systems.
The experiment consists of 2 phases: preparation and operation. The prepa-
ration was run 2 weeks before the experiment to perform the pre-questionnaire
and training. The operation consists of three sessions (30 minutes/session). In
the 1st session, four groups write acceptance test cases. Group A1 (BDD) and
Group A2 (BDD) write test scenarios in Eclipse with the Jbehave plug-in as
a story file. Group B1 (UAT) and Group B2 (UAT) write acceptance criteria
in plaintext. We provide 30 unsafe control actions (UCAs) in an STPA safety
report. When the students finish all the 30 UCAs in 30 minutes, they record the
time in minutes. After the 1st session, the participants record the NIUS and the
time in the operation report. In the 2nd session, Group A1 (BDD) and Group
A2 (BDD) write each test scenario into a test case and run the test case. If it
fails, they should modify the trigger (code) and pass the test case. Group B1
(UAT) and Group B2 (UAT) review Java code, execute the test cases manually
and complete their acceptance test report. At the end of the 2nd session, they
run PIT mutation testing. The LC and MSI are generated automatically in the
PIT test report. They write down the results in the operation report. In the
3rd session, the participant portrays as a developer for 15 minutes and a busi-
ness analyst for 15 minutes. The developer is expected to explain his/her testing
strategy as clearly as possible, while the fictional business analyst should try to
question the developer. To this end, they answer a post-questionnaire.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistic
Measure Treatment Experiment Mean St.Dev Min Median Max 95% CI lower 95% CI upper
NIUS BDD Group A1 0.52 0.24 0.26 0.45 1.20 0.37 0.66
Group A2 0.69 0.19 0.42 0.65 1.00 0.58 0.80
UAT Group B1 0.58 0.22 0.33 0.57 1.00 0.45 0.71
Group B2 0.67 0.29 0.27 0.60 1.20 0.50 0.84
LC BDD Group A1 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.03
Group A2 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03
UAT Group B1 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02
Group B2 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02
MSI BDD Group A1 0.90 0.38 0.36 1.00 1.33 0.67 1.13
Group A2 0.93 0.49 0.44 0.83 2.17 0.63 1.22
UAT Group B1 0.89 0.36 0.42 0.88 1.56 0.67 1.10
Group B2 0.85 0.46 0.30 0.65 1.63 0.58 1.12
COME BDD Group A1 1.27 0.81 -2.00 1.50 2.00 0.79 1.75
Group A2 1.18 0.70 -1.00 1.00 2.00 0.76 1.58
UAT Group B1 -0.05 1.20 -2.00 0.00 2.00 -0.75 0.66
Group B2 0.01 1.13 -2.00 0.50 2.00 -0.67 0.67
Note: St. Dev means standard deviation; CI means confidence interval. NIUS means number of implemented
(tested) user stories per minute. LC means line coverage. MSI means mutation score indicator. COME was
assessed via questionnaire with the results in a 5-point scale from -2 (negative) to +2 (positive).
5 Analysis
5.1 Descriptive analysis
(a) NIUS (b) LC (c) MSI
Fig. 4: Boxplot for PROD, THOR and FAUL
In Table 1, we summarize the descriptive statistics of the gathered mea-
sures13. To sum up, the results from the two systems in one treatment are al-
most identical. BDD and UAT have only small differences regarding NIUS and
13
Raw data is available online: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1154350
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MSI. However, COME in BDD (Mean = 1.27, 1.18; Std.Dev = 0.81, 0.70) and
UAT (Mean = -0.05, 0.01; Std.Dev = 1.20, 1.13) differ more strongly. LC has a
small difference. In Fig. 4, we show a clear comparison and can see some outliers
concerning LC. In Fig. 5, we use an alluvial diagram to show COME. We can
conclude that BDD has a better communication effectiveness than UAT from
the perspective of developers and business analysts respectively (depending on
the length of black vertical bar on the right side of Fig. 5 (a) and Fig. 5 (b)). On
the left side, we list 24 sub-aspects of assessing the communication effectiveness.
The boldness of the colorful lines indicates the degree of impact. A thicker line
has a larger impact on each aspect. We can see six noteworthy values from Fig. 5
(a) that BDD is better than UAT: (4) Test cases have a clear documentation. (5)
They could flush out the functional gaps before development. (6) They have a
good understanding of business requirements. (7) Test cases have a good organi-
zation and structure. (8) Realistic examples make them think harder. (11) There
is an obvious glue between test cases and code. From Fig. 5 (b), five noteworthy
values show that BDD is better than UAT: (6) The developers consider safety
requirements deeply and initially. (8) It is easy to identify conflicts in business
rules and test cases. (9) They are confident about the test cases. (12) They are
clear about the status of acceptance testing. (13) They could spend less time on
sprint-end acceptance testing but more in parallel with development. In addi-
tion, the other aspects show also slightly better results when using BDD than
UAT.
(a) Developer’s perspective (b) Business analyst’s perspective
Fig. 5: Alluvial diagram for communication effectiveness
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5.2 Hypothesis testing
To start with, we evaluate the pre-questionnaire. No statistically significant dif-
ferences between BDD and UAT groups are found concerning Java programming,
acceptance testing, knowledge on SCS and agile techniques (t-test, α = 0.05, p
> 0.05 for all test parameters). Furthermore, we test the normality of the data
distribution with Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests at α = 0.05. The
results show that the data for NIUS in Group A1, for LC in Group A1, A2, B2
and for MSI in Group A1, A2 are not normally distributed. Thus, we use non-
parametric tests in the analysis. In addition to the use of p-values for hypotheses
testing (α = 0.05, one-tailed) from the Mann-Whitney test, Wilcoxon test and
ANOVA test, we include the effect size Cohen’s d. Since we expect BDD to be
better than UAT, we use one-tailed tests. NIUS is not significantly affected by
using the BDD or the UAT approach (system 1: p=0.206; system 2: p=0.359,
non-significant). LC is not significantly affected by using BDD or UAT (system
1: p=0.057; system 2: p=0.051, non-significant). MSI shows no statistically sig-
nificant difference between using BDD or UAT (system 1: p=0.472; system 2:
p=0.359, non-significant). However, COME is significantly different (system 1:
p<0.00001; system 2: p<0.00001, significant). We accept the alternative hypoth-
esis that BDD shows better communication effectiveness than UAT. Cohen’s d
shows the values around 0.2, which signifies small effects, around 0.5 stands for
medium effects and around 0.8 for large effects. Thus, for COME, system 1 shows
a large effect (d = 2.908). For LC we have both medium effects (system 1: d =
0.684; system 2: d = 0.662). The rest of the effects are small.
6 Threats to validity
6.1 Internal validity
First, note that we have four groups in our experiment. To avoid a multiple group
threat, we prepare a pre-questionnaire to investigate the students’ background
knowledge. The results of the t-tests show no statistically significant differences
among the groups concerning each measure. Second, concerning the instrument,
UAT is faster to learn than BDD regarding the use of tools. Even though we
provide a training to narrow the gap, the productivity might have been influ-
enced, since the students have to get familiar with the hierarchy of writing test
suites in a BDD tool. The artifacts, such as tutorials and operation report, are
designed respectively with the same structure to avoid threats. In addition to
the observation, we save the participants’ workspaces after the experiment and
video recordings for deep analysis. Third, the students majoring in software en-
gineering might identify more with the developer role than the business analyst
role. Thus, we design two comparable systems. The students in each pair use dif-
ferent systems and test approaches to reduce the influence of prior knowledge.
Moreover, we provide a reference [36] on how to perform as a business analyst
in an agile project. We also mention their responsibilities in the training.
6.2 Construct validity
First, the execution of BDD is a variant. BDD should begin with writing tests
before coding. However, in our experiment, we use BDD for test-last acceptance
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testing rather than test-driven design. Thus, we provide source code with mu-
tants. The measures we used could be influenced. In BDD test-first, we write
failing test cases first and work on passing all of them to drive coding. Accord-
ing to [39] [41], BDD test-first might be as effective as or even more effective
than BDD test-last. Second, the evaluation concerning productivity, test thor-
oughness, fault detection effectiveness and communication effectiveness does not
seem to be enough. As far as we know, our study is the first controlled experi-
ment on BDD. We can base our measurement (PROD, THOR, FAUL) mainly
on TDD controlled experiments and some limited experiments on safety veri-
fication. There might be better ways to capture how well safety is handled in
testing.
6.3 Conclusion validity
First, concerning violated assumptions of statistical tests, the Mann-Whitney U-
test is robust when the sample size is approximately 20. For each treatment, we
have 22 students. Moreover, we use Wilcoxon W test as well as Z to increase the
robustness. Nevertheless, under certain conditions, non-parametric rank-based
tests can themselves lack robustness [44]. Second, concerning random heterogene-
ity of subjects, we arranged them based on the Java programming experience.
According to the pre-questionnaire, the students are from the same course and
88.6% of them are in the same major.
6.4 External validity
First, the subjects are students. Although there are some skilled students who
could perform as well as experts, most of them lack professional experience.
This consideration may limit the generalization of the results. To consider this
debatable issue in terms of using students as subjects, we refer to [33]. They
said: conducting experiments with professionals as a first step should not be
encouraged unless high sample sizes are guaranteed. In addition, a long learning
cycle and a new technology are two hesitations for using professionals. STPA was
developed in 2012, so there is still a lack of experts on the industrial level. BDD
has not been used for verifying safety requirements. Thus, we believe that using
students as subjects is a suitable way to aggregate contributions in our research
area. We also refer to a study by Cleland-Huang and Rahimi, which successfully
ran an SCS project with graduate students [2]. Second, the simplicity of the tasks
poses a threat. We expect to keep the difficulty of the tasks in accordance with
the capability of students. Nevertheless, the settings are not fully representative
of a real-world project.
7 Discussion & Conclusion
The main benefit of our research is that we propose a possible way to use BDD
for safety verification with STPA for safety analysis in agile development. We
validate the combination in a controlled experiment with the limitation that
we used BDD only in a test-last way. The experiment shows some remarkable
results. The productivity has no statistically significant difference between BDD
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and UAT. That contradicts our original expectation. We would expect BDD,
as an automated testing method, to be more productive than manual UAT.
Yet, as the students are not experts in our experiment, they need considerable
time to get familiar with the BDD tool. The students use Jbehave to write
BDD test cases in our experiment, which has strict constraints on hierarchy and
naming conventions to connect test scenarios with test cases. UAT should be
easier to learn. We therefore analyzed our video recordings and found that BDD
developers use nearly 25% to 50% of their time to construct the hierarchy and
naming. Scanniello et al. [37] also mentioned this difficulty when students apply
TDD. In the future, we plan to use skilled professionals in test automation to
replicate this study. This could lead to different results. The test thoroughness
and fault detection effectiveness show a non-significant difference between BDD
and UAT. We could imagine that our provided Java code is too simplified to
show a significant difference. The mutants are easily found with a review. These
aspects need further research.
The communication effectiveness shows better results by using BDD than
UAT on 24 aspects. We highlight 11 significant aspects. The developers found
that: BDD has a clear documentation. A clear documentation of acceptance
test cases is important for communication [42]. The scenarios are written in
plain English with no hidden test instrumentation. The given-when-then format
is clear for describing test scenarios for safety verification based on system the-
ory. The developers using BDD could flush out functional gaps before
development. The communication concerning safety could happen at the be-
ginning of the development. They discuss safety requirements with the business
analysts and spot the detailed challenges or edge cases before functional develop-
ment. UAT happens mostly at the end of the development. It makes the rework
expensive and is easy to be cut in safety-critical systems. The developers us-
ing BDD have a good understanding of the business requirements.
A good understanding of safety requirements helps an effective communication.
They could build a shared understanding in the “3 Amigos Meeting” to ensure
that their ideas about the safety requirements are consistent with the business
analysts. The developers using UAT might understand safety requirements with
a possible bias. BDD test cases have a good organization and structure.
This makes the test cases easy to understand, especially during maintenance.
They include strict naming conventions and a clear hierarchy to manage test
scenarios and test cases. Realistic examples in BDD make the develop-
ers think harder. The safety requirements are abstract with possibly cognitive
diversity, which leave a lot of space for ambiguity and misunderstanding. That
negatively influences effective communication. Realistic examples give us a much
better way to explain how safe scenarios really work than pure safety require-
ments do. There is an obvious glue between BDD test cases and code.
There is glue code in BDD safety verification, which allows an effective sepa-
ration between safety requirements and implementation details. This glue code
supports the understanding and even communication between business analysts
and developers. In addition, it ensures the bidirectional traceability between
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safety requirements and test cases. The business analysts thought that: The
developers using BDD consider the safety requirements deeply and
initiatively. The collaboration promotes a sense of ownership of the deliverable
products. That increases an initiative communication. Instead of passively read-
ing the documents, the developers participate in the discussion about writing test
scenarios and are more committed to them. The business analysts are more
confident about the BDD test cases. Confidence promotes effective com-
munication [43]. The business analysts could give a big picture with safety goals
to the developers. Feedback from developers and their realistic unsafe scenarios
give the business analysts confidence that the developers understand the safety
goals correctly. It is easy to identify conflicts in business rules and test
cases when using BDD. BDD has a set of readable test scenarios focusing on
business rules (safety requirements). Each test scenario and test case are directly
connected to the code. The business analysts can pull out test cases related to
a particular business rule. This helps communication, especially when there is
a changing request. The business analysts are clear about the status of
acceptance testing when using BDD. It promotes a state-of-art commu-
nication. That can be attributed to the automated test suites, which might be
connected with a continuous integration server and a project management tool
to receive a verification report automatically. The business analysts could
spend less time on sprint-end acceptance tests but more in parallel
with development. They can verify the safety requirements periodically and
therefore enhance communication throughout the project.
In conclusion, to some extent, BDD is an effective method for verifying safety
requirements in agile development. As this is the first experiment investigating
BDD for safety verification, further empirical research is needed to check our
results. We invite replications of this experiment using our replication package14.
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